AfPak Summer 2009 – The Roggio Reader

The LWJ AfPak Summer 2009 Mainlines – An AfPak Research Baseline
Compiled by: Gary H. Johnson, Jr.

AfPak Summer 2009 – The Roggio Reader

The Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 8

Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 8
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Compiled by Gary H. Johnson, Jr. for The AfPak Reader
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November 10, 2009

The Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 7

Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 7
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Compiled by Gary H. Johnson, Jr. for The AfPak Reader
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November 3, 2009

The Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 6

Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 6
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Compiled by Gary H. Johnson, Jr. for The AfPak Reader
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October 27, 2009

The Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 5

Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 5
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Compiled by Gary H. Johnson, Jr. for The AfPak Reader
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October 20,  2009

The Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 4

Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 4
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Compiled by Gary H. Johnson, Jr. for The AfPak Reader
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October 13, 2009

Threat Matrix Reader – AfPak Fall 2009 – Week 1

Threat Matrix Reader – AfPak Fall 2009 – Week 1
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Compiled by Gary H. Johnson, Jr. for The AfPak Reader
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September 22, 2009
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http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/counterterrorism_ops_will_expa.php

Counterterrorism ops without counterinsurgency will expand al Qaeda’s reach
By Bill Roggio
September 22, 2009 5:45 PM

Over at The Weekly Standard, I noted that the proposal to rely on counterterrorism techniques, specifically Predator/Reaper strikes, to take out al Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan in lieu of a counterinsurgency program to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, is seriously flawed. The proponents of this strategy make the assumption that al Qaeda and the Taliban don’t operate closely. But as Taliban / Haqqani Network commander Mullah Sangeen Zadran noted in a recent interview with As Sahab, al Qaeda’s propaganda arm, the Taliban and al Qaeda work together nearly seamlessly toward the same goals – defeating the US and her allies and re-installing the Mullah Omar-led Taliban government.

The Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 3

Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 3
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Compiled by Gary H. Johnson, Jr. for The AfPak Reader
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October 6, 2009

The Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 2

Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 2
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Compiled by Gary H. Johnson, Jr. for The AfPak Reader
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September 29, 2009
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http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=82178
Neighbours asked to back Afghan govt
Mohammad Nauman Dost – Sep 29, 2009 – 10:37
KABUL (PAN): Canada has urged Afghanistan’s neighbours to help the conflict-devastated country restore peace and security and supplement international efforts at bringing prosperity and stability to the war-weary nation.
In a wide-ranging, exclusive interview with Pajhwok Afghan News, the Canadian ambassador in Kabul acknowledged that militants stole into Afghanistan from other countries and thus contributed to insecurity on this side of the border.
“Historically, the neighbours of Afghanistan have often played a role in supporting insurgents and different ethnic groups within this country. And that’s something that needs to change,” the ambassador stressed.
William Crosbie called for the neighbours of Afghanistan to join with the government in Kabul in support of the future that “we are all trying to create: A safe, prosperous and peaceful country that lives in peace with its neighbours. They need to be part of the solution here.”
Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents, enjoying safe havens in Pakistan’s lawless tribal region, sneaked into Afghanistan, said the envoy, who described cross-border militant infiltration as an important part of the problem.
In some parts of Pakistan, the diplomat believed, the militants enjoyed safe havens. In the same breath, however, he explained the government of Pakistan was doing its bit to tackle in a serious way the issue of terrorist sanctuaries on its soil.

The Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 1

Pajhwok Reports – Fall 2009 – Week 1
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Compiled by Gary H. Johnson, Jr. for the AfPak Reader
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September 22, 2009
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http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=81882
Suspected bombers killed as explosives go off
Abdul Qadir Siddique – Sep 22, 2009 – 16:27
KABUL (PAN): Three suspected suicide bombers were killed when the explosives in their possession went off prematurely in a house in the western Nimroz province, the interior ministry said Tuesday.
The incident happened in the Nalan area of Dilaram district late Monday night, the ministry said in statement issued here.
The suicide bombers were preparing for an attack against foreign forces in the area, but killed by their own explosives.
The incident is under investigation, added the release.
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http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=81883
NATO-Afghan military base comes under attack
Lemar Niazi – Sep 22, 2009 – 16:41
KHOST CITY (PAN): Several missiles were fired at a joint base of Afghan and foreign forces in the southeastern Khost province late Monday night, the western military alliance said Tuesday.

Remote Security Bubbles

Remote Security Bubbles

By: Gary H. Johnson, Jr. | 10/9/09

Classic counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine holds to three primary pillars: security, progress, and good governance.  Often called “the ink-spot strategy,” the three pillars are implemented simultaneously through a process known as “clear, hold, and build.”  The aim of COIN is to build the confidence of local populations in the legitimacy of their government’s desire to provide security.  In this effort, small military units deploy in hostile territory to clear insurgent threats and establish a safe haven from which development programs and intelligence operations can provide local populations with a sense of security.  Fraught with pitfalls and setbacks, COIN is a slow process of countering an insurgency’s influence over a local population.  The success or failure of COIN operations is measurable in terms of a persistent, well-resourced presence.

In Afghanistan’s rugged terrain, COIN operations have yielded fragile security gains in 8 years of warfare, especially evident in the northeastern provinces.  In the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan along the Pakistan border, a number of Coalition outposts, each manned by a contingent of less than a hundred soldiers, provide remote security bubbles for an increasingly hostile local population.  Unfortunately, the classic COIN methodology, in these FOBs, has morphed into a defensive counterpunching effort.  In effect, the “clear, hold, build” model has been exchanged for a “hold, build, clear” model in Afghanistan’s remote outposts due to multiple realities on the ground.